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ABSTRACT 
We contribute to the literature on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with housing 
collaterals by including shocks to house price expectations. We incorporate endogenous mortgage 
defaults which are rarely included in DSGE models with housing collaterals. We show that our 
theoretical model of mortgage default is consistent with empirical evidence. We use this 
particular DSGE setup to study the effects of variations in house price expectations on 
macroeconomic dynamics and their implications for monetary policy. Extensive model 
simulations show that an increase in expected future house prices leads to a decline in mortgage 
default rates as well as in interest rates on loans, whereas it leads to an increase in house prices, 
household debt, bank leverage ratios and economic activity. As opposed to previous studies we 
find that inflation is low during a house price boom. Finally, we demonstrate that although 
monetary policy that reacts to household credit growth improves the stability of the real economy 
and enhances financial stability, yet it jeopardizes price stability. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Fluctuations in house prices can have a great impact on the real economy as it was clearly 
demonstrated by the burst of the U.S real estate bubble in 2006 as well as the burst of the 
Japanese housing bubble in the early 1990s. Indeed, Shiller (2007) note right before the burst that 
the U.S. experienced the biggest house price boom in its history. In Figure 1, which displays the 
real house prices for the U.S., it is evident that the boom started in 1997 and ended in 2006, when 
house prices suddenly collapsed and thereafter entered its worst recession since the 1930s. 
In their survey of homebuyers Case and Shiller (2003) find that in 2003 a large share of home 
buyers expected future house prices to rise over the next several years. Shiller (2007) and Case et 
al. (2012) find that expectations of a boost in future house prices played an important role in 
determining the upcoming U.S. house price boom. Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) demonstrate 
that a fraction of households whose optimism reflects price appreciations grew during the U.S. 
boom and generated an after-effect on house price dynamics. Lambertini et al. (2013) using data 
on expectations about future property prices by the Michigan Survey of Consumers, show via a 
VAR model that the expectations of rising house prices explain a large part of business cycle 
oscillations during the U.S. price boom. Additionally, Ling et al. (2015) find that non-
fundamental components of the U.S. housing market sentiment can predict price fluctuations 
above and beyond movements in fundamentals. Towbin and Weber (2015) after estimating a 
VAR model for the U.S. economy, illustrated that shocks to house price expectations are the most 
important drivers of house prices, as they generate a significant persistence component in the 
GDP. All the aforementioned studies indicate that expectations play an important role as the 
driving forces of house prices. Interestingly though, shocks to house price expectations are 
mostly absent in DSGE models including a housing collateral. Such examples can be encountered 
in the works of Iacoviello (2005), Gerali et al. (2010), Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Forlati and 
Lambertini (2011), Liu et al. (2013) and Iacoviello (2015). Hence, unlike the models reported in 
those studies, our setup incorporates shocks to house price expectations under a DSGE 
framework with housing collaterals. 
The purpose of this paper is to study the role of house price expectations and the implications 
for macroeconomic dynamics and monetary policy under a DSGE model with housing 
collaterals. Our model includes many sectors, e.g., household, business, entrepreneur, retail, 
banking sector and a central bank. In particular, the household sector is comprises two types: 
financially unconstrained and financially constrained households. Both types consume, work and 
buy houses. The financially constrained households use their housing stock as collateral to obtain 
loans from the banking sector to buy houses. The business sector consists of entrepreneurs who 
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use labor, capital and housing stock to produce intermediate goods. Entrepreneurs are financially 
constrained agents utilizing their housing stock as collateral to obtain loans from the banking 
sector. The latter sector is represented by commercial banks which collect deposits from 
financially unconstrained households and provide funds to financially constrained households and 
entrepreneurs. The commercial banks face a capital requirement. Furthermore, the retail sector 
consists of monopolistic retailers who transform intermediate goods into final goods; this sector 
is the source of price stickiness in the economy. Lastly, the central bank conducts monetary 
policy. We include two features that are not typically included in a DSGE model with housing 
collaterals, namely shocks to house price expectations and endogenous mortgage defaults. In our 
model, a positive shock to price expectations leads to an increase in prices and consequently the 
boom is caused by optimistic expectations about future property prices. The decision of mortgage 
default is endogenous in the sense that financially constrained households default when the value 
of their houses is lower than the stipulated mortgage loan repayment. Furthermore, the 
commercial bank’s lending decisions are influenced by the bank capital position which is affected 
by house prices. The commercial bank also takes into account expected mortgage defaults when 
making loans to financially constrained households. 
While Kollmann et al. (2011) and Iacoviello (2015) also include a banking sector under a 
similar setup, notably they do not model loan defaults as exogenous shocks. In addition, these 
works do not include shocks to house price expectations, as opposed to ours. Accordingly, 
although Forlati and Lambertini (2011) include endogenous mortgage defaults and variations in 
mortgage defaults with the latter depending on variations in mortgage risk, in our modeling 
framework mortgage defaults derive from variations in expected future house prices. As such, the 
models by Forlati and Lambertini (2011) and Iacoviello (2015) imply that variations in mortgage 
defaults lead movements in house prices, so a decline in mortgage defaults leads to an increase in 
house prices. In contrast to the aforementioned works, our theoretical model of defaults implies 
that a rise in optimistic expectations about future house prices leads to an increase in house 
prices, which in turn leads to a decline in mortgage defaults. Hence, our mortgage default 
component behaves consistently with econometric evidence which shows that variations in house 
prices lead movements in mortgage defaults, yet not vice versa. On the whole, we use our 
proposed DSGE model with endogenous mortgage defaults to examine the effects of shocks to 
house price expectations on the real economy and financial activities i.e., household debt, 
business debt, bank leverage ratio, mortgage default rate, interest rates on household and business 
loans. We also investigate the effects of shocks to house price expectations on inflation dynamics 
and provide evidence that our DSGE model may explain why inflation is low during a house 
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price boom. Interestingly, we also demonstrate the mechanism according to which the reaction of 
monetary policy to household credit growth can reduce the volatility of output and inflation. 
We contribute to the relevant literature in the following manner: we embed shocks to house 
price expectations into a DSGE model with housing collaterals, and we include endogenous 
mortgage defaults which depend on variations in expected future house prices. Eventually, the 
DSGE model allows for an interplay between the household sector and the banking sector 
through the house price and expected mortgage default channels. We learn that optimistic 
expectations about future property price appreciations can generate a housing market boom and a 
credit boom, yet at the same time we observe a period of low inflation. Monetary policy that 
reacts to household credit growth reduces the volatility of output and dampens the credit boom, 
but these effects lead to higher inflation volatility. Consequently, the central bank when it 
includes financial stability considerations in its monetary policy decisions, might miss its 
inflation target in the short-run. 
Furthermore, the main findings from the DSGE model simulations are as follows: firstly, we 
see that a positive house price expectation shock leads to a rise in prices, housing demand, 
household debt, business debt and bank leverage ratio, whilst it leads to a decline in mortgage 
default rate and interest rates on household and business loans. The positive shock generates an 
increase in the real economic indicators and in financial/banking activities. The intuition behind 
our results is that a rise in expectations about future house prices increases the expected value of 
housing collaterals and the expected resale value of houses. Hence, these effects eventually 
induce financially constrained households to increase their demand for houses, which in turn 
leads to an increase in household debt. The rise in house prices leads to a rise in home equity 
whereas at the same time it projects a decline in mortgage default rate, which is in accordance 
with econometric evidence in the relevant literature. The increase in house prices induces 
commercial banks to expand loan supply, which drives down interest rates on household and 
business loans, but this effect increases the bank leverage ratio. The increase in loan supply to 
financially constrained households and entrepreneurs stimulates the real economy. As a side 
effect also the rise in house prices relaxes entrepreneurs’ collateral constraints, which encourages 
the entrepreneurs to increase capital investment. 
Our second finding is that inflation tends to be low during a house price boom and amid a 
credit boom, whereas previous studies such as by Bernanke and Gertler (2000), Forlati and 
Lambertini (2011) and Badarau and Popescu (2014) report that inflation tends to be higher during 
asset price booms in general. This result has important ramifications for monetary policy and 
financial stability. Specifically, the central bank observes a downward pressure on inflation and 
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responds to the shock to house price expectations by reducing the policy rate. This further 
magnifies the rise in real estate demand, household debt and bank leverage ratios, therefore it 
increases financial instability. Obviously, the real economy becomes more vulnerable to a 
housing market meltdown. For example, Christiano et al. (2010) argued that during the Japanese 
stock market boom in the 1980s, the Bank of Japan cut the policy rate to stimulate inflation which 
in turn amplified the stock market boom1. Ultimately, asset prices collapsed and the Japanese 
economy underwent a severe recession. 
Thirdly, we find that monetary policy which reacts to household credit growth, dampens the 
response of the real economy to house price expectation shocks, yet it amplifies the response of 
inflation in the short-run. Monetary policy that takes into account credit growth reduces the 
volatility of output but increases the volatility of inflation. Moreover, by reacting to household 
credit growth, the exercised monetary policy reduces housing demand, household debt and bank 
leverage ratio, hence it enhances real economy and financial stability, albeit to the cost of price 
stability. 
Our proposed setup is related to DSGE modeling with collateral constraints as already 
mentioned, and in particular is based on the framework of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and 
Iacoviello (2005) wherein the amount economic agents can borrow is tied to the value of their 
collateral. Similarly in our model, the amount of loans that financially constrained households 
can obtain are tied to the value of their houses. The collateral constraint framework has been 
applied also by Monacelli (2009), Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Jermann and Quadrini (2012), 
Calza et al. (2013), Lambertini et al. (2013), Liu et al. (2013) and Walentin (2014). Nevertheless, 
as opposed to our DSGE model, their models do not include debt defaults. Unlike Kollmann et al. 
(2011) and Iacoviello (2015) who treat loan defaults as exogenous shocks, we model mortgage 
defaults as an endogenous process, in a way that households default when the value of their 
houses is lower than the mortgage loan repayment. Furthermore, in contrast to the model of 
Kollmann et al. (2011) and Iacoviello (2015) our model has sticky prices, so we can directly 
analyze the effects of variations in house price expectations upon inflation dynamics. Our 
banking sector accommodates different interest rates under a perfect banking competition 
framework with a representative bank facing capital requirements (Kollmann et al., 2011).2 
Overall, all aforementioned studies do not include shocks to house price expectations in their 
models. 
                                                 
1 The Japanese economy experienced both a stock market boom and a house price boom in the 1980s. 
2 Other DSGE studies incorporating a financial intermediary or a banking sector can be found in Gerali et al. (2010), 
Andrés and Arce (2012), Gambacorta and Signoretti (2014), Verona et al. (2014) and Bekiros and Paccagnini (2016). 
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The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents empirical findings vis-à-vis the 
relationship between house prices and mortgage default rates. Section 3 introduces a DSGE 
model with endogenous mortgage defaults, whilst section 4 displays the impact of stochastic 
processes for shocks to house price expectations. Section 5 presents the calibration of our model 
parameters and section 6 highlights the quantitative results from extensive model simulations. 
Section 7 discusses implications for monetary policy and section 8 conducts a sensitivity analysis. 
Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HOUSE PRICES AND MORTGAGE DEFAULT RATES 
In this section, we present our empirical findings regarding the link between house prices and 
mortgage default rates. We conduct a Granger causality analysis and then we examine the effects 
of a positive shock to real house prices on mortgage default rate under a bivariate VAR model for 
the U.S utilizing quarterly data from 1991 Q1 to 2015 Q4. 3,4 The lag order (four) is determined 
using the Schwarz information criterion. Table 1 presents the Granger causality test results, 
which indicate that real house prices Granger cause mortgage defaults. Hence, real house prices 
carry significant information for mortgage default rates, but not vice versa. This econometric 
evidence supports our assumption that fluctuations in real house prices lead those in mortgage 
defaults, as opposed to Forlati and Lambertini (2011) and Iacoviello (2015) who both imply that 
variations in mortgage defaults lead movements in house prices.5 
Figure 2 displays the impulse responses in the mortgage default rates and real house prices to 
positive house price shocks. We use a Cholesky decomposition to identify the structural VAR 
following an ordering where the mortgage default rate comes first and the house prices are last, 
implying that i) a house price shock has an immediate impact on house prices and ii) this price 
shock does not affect the mortgage default rates contemporaneously. These assumptions are 
realistic taking into account that households do not default immediately as their housing value 
becomes less than the loan repayment. Furthermore, we want to show that even though a house 
price shock does not impact mortgage default rates immediately, interestingly the house price 
shock generates a strong persistence in mortgage rates. In addition, Figure 2 clearly indicates that 
a positive house price shock has a negative effect on default rates and a positive shock to house 
prices leads to a strongly persistent mortgage default rate, although their interrelationship is not 
                                                 
3 Mortgage default rate is measured as the delinquency rate on residential mortgages. For more details please see 
Appendix II. 
4 All variables are deviated from linear trend. The starting date for our econometric model is reflected by data 
availability with respect to the mortgage default rate. 
5 The comprehensive version of our theoretical model - which incorporates mortgage defaults - is included in section 
3.2. 
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contemporaneous. Our specific ordering of house prices before the mortgage default rate does not 
change the qualitative response to house price shocks, however when it is reversed the effects of 
house price shocks on mortgage default rate become slightly stronger. 
 In general, the aforementioned econometric results support our assumption that an increase in 
house prices causes a decline in mortgage defaults. In the next section, we elaborate on the 
concept of endogenous mortgage defaults and thereby we incorporate endogenous mortgage 
defaults and house price expectation shocks into a novel DSGE model. 
 
3. DSGE MODEL 
We incorporate a mortgage default channel, a banking sector and house price expectation shocks 
in our DSGE model. The economy is composed of six types of agents, i.e., financially 
unconstrained and constrained households, entrepreneurs, commercial banks, monopolistic 
retailers and the central bank. Both types of households supply their labor supply to 
entrepreneurs, consume and then buy houses. Financially constrained households take loans from 
a commercial bank and borrow in accordance with the value of their house. The financially 
constrained households default when the value of their house is lower than the stipulated 
mortgage loan repayment. Entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods and perceive the price of 
intermediate goods as given. Also, entrepreneurs are credit constrained and pay back all loans 
which means that they do not default on their loans. The maturity of loans to the financially 
constrained households and entrepreneurs is one-period. Commercial banks obtain deposits from 
financially unconstrained households and provide loans to financially constrained households as 
well as to entrepreneurs. Commercial bank assets comprise household and business loans. 
Moreover, commercial banks face capital requirements while their balance sheets are affected by 
mortgage defaults and house prices. Monopolistic retailers transform intermediate goods to final 
goods and the retail sector is the source of price rigidity in the economy. Lastly, the central bank 
conducts monetary policy. Below we describe each agent in detail. 
 
3.1 Financially Unconstrained Household 
The expected utility of a representative financially unconstrained household is 
𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝑈 𝑡∞𝑡=0 �𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑈,𝑡 + 𝜈ℎ𝑙𝑛𝐻𝑈,𝑡 − �𝑁𝑈,𝑡�𝜂+1𝜂+1 �  (1) 
where 𝛽𝑈 represents the discount factor, 𝐶𝑈,𝑡 the current consumption, 𝐻𝑈,𝑡 denotes the holding of 
housing stock, 𝑁𝑈,𝑡 the labor hours, 𝜈ℎ the weight on housing and 𝜂 the inverse Frisch labor 
supply elasticity. 
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The financially unconstrained household receives the gross interest income upon last period 
deposits i.e., 𝑅𝑡−1𝐷𝑡−1 𝜋𝑡⁄ , where 𝑅𝑡−1 is the gross nominal interest rate on deposits, 𝐷𝑡−1 the 
last period deposits and 𝜋𝑡 the inflation. The household earns the real wage rate 𝑊𝑈,𝑡 for 
supplying 𝑁𝑈,𝑡 hours to an entrepreneur. The real house prices are denoted by 𝑞𝑡. The financially 
unconstrained household uses income for consumption 𝐶𝑈,𝑡 buys houses at 𝑞𝑡�𝐻𝑈,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑈,𝑡−1� and 
makes deposits 𝐷𝑡 at a commercial bank. As the owner of a retail firm, the financially 
unconstrained household receives the lump-sum profit 𝐹𝑡 . The budget constraint is expressed as 
follows   𝐶𝑈,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡�𝐻𝑈,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑈,𝑡−1� = 𝑅𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝑊𝑈,𝑡𝑁𝑈,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡  (2) 
The financially unconstrained household chooses 𝐶𝑈,𝑡, 𝐷𝑡, 𝐻𝑈,𝑡, and 𝑁𝑈,𝑡 to maximize equation 
(1) subject to (2); the first-order conditions are 
1
𝐶𝑈,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑈𝐸𝑡 � 1𝐶𝑈,𝑡+1 𝑅𝑡𝜋𝑡+1�  (3) 
𝑞𝑡
𝐶𝑈,𝑡 = 𝜈ℎ𝐻𝑈,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑈𝐸𝑡 � 𝑞𝑡+1𝐶𝑈,𝑡+1�  (4) 
and 
𝑊𝑈,𝑡
𝐶𝑈,𝑡 = 𝑁𝑈,𝑡𝜂   (5) 
Equation (3) is a standard consumption Euler equation that captures the household’s 
intertemporal choice between current and future consumption. Current consumption depends 
negatively on the real deposit interest rate 𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1⁄ ). Equation (4) is the optimal holding of 
housing stock. The left-hand side captures the marginal cost of acquiring an additional unit of 
house 𝑞𝑡 𝐶𝑈,𝑡⁄ , whereas the right-hand side depicts the marginal benefit of purchasing an extra 
unit of house, which comprises the marginal utility of having a house 𝜈ℎ 𝐻𝑈,𝑡⁄  and the expected 
resale value of the house 𝛽𝑈𝐸𝑡�𝑞𝑡+1 𝐶𝑈,𝑡+1⁄ �. The optimal hours worked are determined by 
equation (5).6 
 
3.2 Financially Constrained Household 
The expected utility of a representative financially constrained household is given by 
𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝐹 𝑡∞𝑡=0 �𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐹,𝑡 + 𝜈ℎ𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐹,𝑡 − �𝑁𝐹,𝑡�𝜂+1𝜂+1 �  (6) 
The discount factor of the financially constrained household is symbolized as 𝛽𝐹. 𝐶𝐹,𝑡 is the 
consumption while 𝐻𝐹,𝑡 denotes the holding of housing stock, 𝑁𝐹,𝑡 the labor hours, 𝜈ℎ the weight 
on housing and 𝜂 similarly to equation (1), the inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity. 
                                                 
6 The exact derivation of first order conditions can be found in Appendix I. 
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This type of household receives the real wage rate 𝑊𝐹,𝑡 for supplying 𝑁𝐹,𝑡 hours to the 
entrepreneur, and the obtains new loans 𝐿𝐹,𝑡 from a commercial bank. The financially constrained 
household buys houses 𝑞𝑡�𝐻𝐹,𝑡 − 𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1�. Furthermore, the amount of debt that the financially 
constrained household has agreed to pay back is 𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1 𝜋𝑡⁄ , where 𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1 is the gross 
nominal interest rate on one-period mortgage loans (including repayment) and 𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1 𝜋𝑡⁄  
represents the gross real interest on mortgage loans. However, the financially constrained 
household can default on its loans by paying back less than the contractual obligations, hence 𝑍𝐹,𝑡 
is the amount of mortgage defaults which will be determined below. The budget constraint is 
expressed as 
𝐶𝐹,𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡�𝐻𝐹,𝑡 − 𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1� + 𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1 − 𝑍𝐹,𝑡 = 𝐿𝐹,𝑡 + 𝑊𝐹,𝑡𝑁𝐹,𝑡  (7) 
The financially constrained household cannot borrow more than a fraction 𝑚𝐹 of the expected 
value of the house. The collateral constraint is written similarly as in Iacoviello (2005), namely 
𝐸𝑡 �
𝑅𝐹,𝑡
𝜋𝑡+1
� 𝐿𝐹,𝑡 ≤ 𝑚𝐹𝐸𝑡�𝑞𝑡+1𝐻𝐹,𝑡�  (8) 
Thereafter we explain the mechanism of endogenous mortgage default; the financially 
constrained household consists of many members 𝑖 who all purchase houses 𝐻𝐹,𝑡𝑖 . The total 
housing stock of the household is 𝐻𝐹,𝑡 = ∫ 𝐻𝐹,𝑡𝑖1𝑖=0 𝑑𝑖. In each period, each member’s house value 
is subject to an idiosyncratic iid shock 𝜔𝑖 such that the value of the house becomes 𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡𝑖 �1 +
𝜔𝑖�. The household member defaults when the value of the house is lower than the mortgage loan 
repayment i.e., �𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1 𝜋𝑡⁄ � > 𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡𝑖 �1 + 𝜔𝑖�. Let 𝜔� be the threshold value of the shock 
for which the member will pay back the mortgages, thus 𝜔� = 𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − 1. If the household 
member draws an 𝜔 lower than 𝜔�, the member will default. Let −𝜔� be the lower bound of the 
distribution where 𝜔� > 0 and 𝑓(𝜔) the probability density function of 𝜔. The amount of 
mortgage defaults 𝑍𝐹,𝑡 is determined by the following integral 
𝑍𝐹,𝑡 = ∫ �𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 − 𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1(1 + 𝜔)��𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 �−1−𝜔� 𝑓(𝜔)𝑑𝜔  (9) 
The intuition behind equation (9) is the following: the household defaults on the loans if the iid 
shock ranges between its lowest possible value and the critical value of the shock at which the 
default occurs. In the case of default, the amount of mortgage defaults is the promised repayment 
of the loan minus the value of the house that is taken over by the commercial bank. 𝑍𝐹,𝑡 is the 
realized mortgage defaults. To simplify, we assume that 𝑓(𝜔) is constant in the relevant interval 
such that 𝑓(𝜔) = 𝑓. By evaluating the integral, we can obtain the following amount of mortgage 
defaults 
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𝑍𝐹,𝑡 = 𝑓 𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−12 �𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − (1 − 𝜔�)�2  (10) 
We now take the derivative of 𝑍𝐹,𝑡 with respect to 𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1and 𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 
𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡
𝜕𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1 = 𝑓 𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 �𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − (1 − 𝜔�)� > 0  (11) 
and 
𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡
𝜕𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 = − 𝑓2𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 �𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − (1 −𝜔�)��𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 � 
−
𝑓
2𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 �𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − (1 − 𝜔�)� (1 − 𝜔�)�𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1� < 0  (12) 
Equation (11) implies that one more unit of loans will lead to more mortgage defaults given that 
the holding of the housing stock is constant. Equation (12) implies that an additional unit of 
houses leads to less mortgage defaults given that the unit of loans is constant.7 The financially 
constrained household chooses 𝐶𝐹,𝑡, 𝐿𝐹,𝑡,𝐻𝐹,𝑡 and 𝑁𝐹,𝑡 to maximize (6) subject to (7), (8) and 
(10). The first-order conditions are as follows 
1
𝐶𝐹,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 � 1𝐶𝐹,𝑡+1 𝑅𝐹,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� + 𝜆𝐹,𝑡𝐸𝑡 �𝑅𝐹,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� − 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 � 1𝐶𝐹,𝑡+1 𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡+1𝜕𝐿𝐹,𝑡 �  (13) 
𝑞𝑡
𝐶𝐹,𝑡 = 𝜈ℎ𝐻𝐹,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 � 𝑞𝑡+1𝐶𝐹,𝑡+1� + 𝜆𝐹,𝑡𝑚𝐹𝐸𝑡(𝑞𝑡+1) + 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 � 1𝐶𝐹,𝑡+1 𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡+1𝜕𝐻𝐹,𝑡 �  (14) 
and 
𝑊𝐹,𝑡
𝐶𝐹,𝑡 = 𝑁𝐹,𝑡𝜂  (15) 
Equation (13) is the Euler condition for consumption with collateral constraint and endogenous 
loan default. 𝜆𝐹,𝑡 is the multiplier on the collateral constraint (8). Evidently, equation (13) implies 
that when the household maximizes utility, the marginal utility of consuming one more unit of 
goods today (1 𝐶𝐹,𝑡⁄ ) is equal to the marginal utility of consuming one more unit of goods in the 
next period, taking into account interest rate 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 �
1
𝐶𝐹,𝑡+1 𝑅𝐹,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� plus two terms: the first of these 
terms is 𝜆𝐹,𝑡𝐸𝑡 �𝑅𝐹,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1�, which reflects the fact that the more financially constrained the household 
is, the less it will consume today. The last term 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 �
1
𝐶𝐹,𝑡+1 𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡+1𝜕𝐿𝐹,𝑡 � arises because for a given 
investment in houses, one more unit of loans increases the expected default probability. This 
effect reduces the repayment of the loan, which in turn reduces the cost of consumption and 
obviously increases consumption. 
                                                 
7 The derivation of the mortgage default conditions is analyzed in Appendix I. 
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Moreover, equation (14) determines the optimal holding of houses. The left-hand side is the 
marginal cost of purchasing an extra unit of house. As the household buys one more unit of 
houses, the household reduces consumption. The right-hand side contains four components: the 
direct utility gain of having a house 𝜈ℎ 𝐻𝐹,𝑡⁄ , the expected resale value of the house 
𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡�𝑞𝑡+1 𝐶𝐹,𝑡+1⁄ �, the expected marginal benefit of using house as collateral 𝜆𝐹,𝑡𝑚𝐹𝐸𝑡(𝑞𝑡+1), 
and the expected mortgage defaults 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 �
1
𝐶𝐹,𝑡+1 𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡+1𝜕𝐻𝐹,𝑡 �. The housing collateral channel term 
𝜆𝐹,𝑡𝑚𝐹𝐸𝑡(𝑞𝑡+1) implies that a more relaxed collateral constraint signifies lower 𝜆𝐹,𝑡, which 
sequentially induces the household to buy more houses. The expected mortgage default term 
𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 �
1
𝐶𝐹,𝑡+1 𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡+1𝜕𝐻𝐹,𝑡 � implies that by holding more houses the financially constrained household 
can borrow more, which in turn provides the household with an incentive to buy more houses. 
However, holding more houses for given loans reduces the expected defaults, which makes it less 
attractive to buy more houses. Finally, the labor supply decision for the financially constrained 
household is determined by equation (15). 
 
3.3 Entrepreneur 
An entrepreneur has the following objective function 
𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝐸 𝑡∞𝑡=0 �𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐸,𝑡�  (16) 
where 𝛽𝐸 is her discount factor and 𝐶𝐸,𝑡 the entrepreneur’s consumption. She produces an 
intermediate good 𝑌𝐸,𝑡 and sells the intermediate good to a retailer at a price 𝑃𝑡𝑊 . The retailer 
transforms the intermediate good without costs into a final good and then the retailer sells the 
final good to other agents, namely to the entrepreneur, to the financially unconstrained and 
constrained households and to the banker at the retail price of 𝑃𝑡 . The markup of the final good 
over the intermediate good is defined as 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 𝑃𝑡𝑊⁄ . The entrepreneur uses capital, houses and 
labor to produce an intermediate good. The production function is given by 
𝑌𝐸,𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡−1𝜇 𝐻𝐸,𝑡−1𝜈 𝑁𝑈,𝑡𝛼(1−𝜇−𝜈)𝑁𝐹,𝑡(1−𝛼)(1−𝜇−𝜈)  (17) 
where 𝐾𝑡−1 is the capital that depreciates at rate 𝛿, 𝐻𝐸,𝑡−1 the housing input, and 𝑁𝑈,𝑡 and 𝑁𝐹,𝑡 
respectively are the financially unconstrained and constrained household labor inputs. The 
parameter 𝛼 determines the labor income share of the financially unconstrained household and 
the parameters 𝜇 and 𝜈 represent the capital and housing shares in the production function. The 
constraint assumption for the flow of funds is given by 
𝐶𝐸,𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡�𝐻𝐸,𝑡 − 𝐻𝐸,𝑡−1� + 𝑅𝐸,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐿𝐸,𝑡−1 + 𝑊𝑈,𝑡𝑁𝑈,𝑡 + 𝑊𝐹,𝑡𝑁𝐹,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜉𝐾,𝑡 = 𝑌𝐸,𝑡𝑋𝑡 + 𝐿𝐸,𝑡     (18) 
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Wage payments to the households are estimated as 𝑊𝑈,𝑡𝑁𝑈,𝑡 + 𝑊𝐹,𝑡𝑁𝐹,𝑡, and capital investment is 
denoted 𝐼𝑡. The entrepreneur faces capital adjustment costs 𝜉𝐾,𝑡 = (𝜓𝑘 2𝛿⁄ ) � 𝐼𝑡𝐾𝑡−1 − 𝛿�2 𝐾𝑡−1, 
where 𝜓𝑘 is a capital adjustment cost parameter. The capital accumulation is 𝐾𝑡 = (1 −
𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡. The entrepreneur invests in the housing stock 𝑞𝑡�𝐻𝐸,𝑡 − 𝐻𝐸,𝑡−1� and obtains loans 
𝐿𝐸,𝑡 from a commercial bank. The entrepreneur pays back the loans 𝑅𝐸,𝑡−1𝐿𝐸,𝑡−1 𝜋𝑡⁄  to the 
commercial bank, where 𝑅𝐸,𝑡−1 is the gross nominal interest rate on business loans. 
Next, the entrepreneur faces a collateral constraint and she cannot borrow more than a fraction 
𝑚𝐸 of the expected value of housing stock 𝐸𝑡�𝑞𝑡+1𝐻𝐸,𝑡�. The collateral constraint is written as  
𝐸𝑡 �
𝑅𝐸,𝑡
𝜋𝑡+1
� 𝐿𝐸,𝑡 ≤ 𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑡�𝑞𝑡+1𝐻𝐸,𝑡� (19) 
The entrepreneur chooses 𝐶𝐸,𝑡,  𝐿𝐸,𝑡,  𝐾𝑡,  𝐼𝑡,  𝑁𝑈,𝑡,  𝑁𝐹,𝑡, 𝐻𝐸,𝑡 to maximize the objective function 
(16) subject to equations (17), (18) and (19). The first-order conditions are calculated as follows 
1
𝐶𝐸,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡 � 1𝐶𝐸,𝑡+1 𝑅𝐸,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� + 𝜆𝐸,𝑡𝐸𝑡 �𝑅𝐸,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1�  (20) 
𝑞𝑡
𝐶𝐸,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 � 𝛽𝐸𝐶𝐸,𝑡+1 �𝜈 𝑌𝐸,𝑡+1𝑋𝑡+1𝐻𝐸,𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡+1�� + 𝜆𝐸,𝑡𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑡(𝑞𝑡+1)   (21) 
𝜇𝐸,𝑡 = 1𝐶𝐸,𝑡 �1 + 𝜓𝑘𝛿 � 𝐼𝑡𝐾𝑡−1 − 𝛿��  (22) 
𝜇𝐸,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡 � 1𝐶𝐸,𝑡+1 �𝜓𝑘𝛿 �𝐼𝑡+1𝐾𝑡 − 𝛿� 𝐼𝑡+1𝐾𝑡 − 𝜓𝑘2𝛿 �𝐼𝑡+1𝐾𝑡 − 𝛿�2�� +𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡 � 𝜇𝑌𝐸,𝑡+1𝐶𝐸,𝑡+1𝑋𝑡+1𝐾𝑡 + 𝜇𝐸,𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿)� (23) 
𝛼(1 − 𝜇 − 𝜈) 𝑌𝐸,𝑡
𝑋𝑡
= 𝑊𝑈,𝑡𝑁𝑈,𝑡  (24) (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜇 − 𝜈) 𝑌𝐸,𝑡
𝑋𝑡
= 𝑊𝐹,𝑡𝑁𝐹,𝑡  (25) 
The entrepreneur’s Euler consumption condition is given by equation (20), where 𝜆𝐸,𝑡 is the 
multiplier on her borrowing constraint (19). The optimal investment in the housing market is 
determined by equation (21) and the marginal cost of holding an extra unit of the house is 
𝑞𝑡 𝐶𝐸,𝑡⁄ . The marginal benefit of an additional investment in the housing market comprises the 
expected future marginal product of house  𝐸𝑡 � 𝛽𝐸𝐶𝐸,𝑡+1 𝜈𝑌𝐸,𝑡+1𝑋𝑡+1𝐻𝐸,𝑡�, the expected resale value of house 
𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡�𝑞𝑡+1 𝐶𝐸,𝑡+1⁄ � and the marginal benefit of using house as collateral 𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑡�𝜆𝐸,𝑡𝑞𝑡+1�. A more 
relaxed collateral constraint implies that 𝜆𝐸,𝑡 is lower; this increases the marginal benefit of 
having houses as collateral, which in turn increases the incentive to buy more houses. The 
decision on capital investment is given by equations (22) and (23). Equations (24) and (25) are 
labor demand equations. 
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3.4 Commercial Bank 
For the banker the preference is defined as 
𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝐵 𝑡∞𝑡=0 �𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐵,𝑡�  (26) 
where her discount factor is 𝛽𝐵 and 𝐶𝐵,𝑡 the banker’s consumption. The commercial bank’s assets 
comprises loans to the financially constrained household 𝐿𝐹,𝑡 as well as loans to the entrepreneur 
𝐿𝐸,𝑡. The commercial bank obtains deposits 𝐷𝑡 from the financially unconstrained household to 
finance its loan operations. The commercial bank capital is expressed as 
𝐾𝐵,𝑡 = 𝐿𝐹,𝑡 + 𝐿𝐸,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡  (27) 
We follow Kollmann et al. (2011) in assuming that a commercial bank faces a capital to asset 
ratio requirement 𝛾. When a commercial bank deviates from a required or desired capital ratio the 
bank faces a 𝜙𝑡 cost, which is a function of bank’s excess capital 𝑋𝐵,𝑡. The bank excess capital 
𝑋𝐵,𝑡 is defined as the difference between the bank capital 𝐾𝐵,𝑡 and a fraction 𝛾 of the bank’s 
assets (𝐿𝐹,𝑡 + 𝐿𝐸,𝑡) as 
𝑋𝐵,𝑡 = 𝐾𝐵,𝑡 − 𝛾(𝐿𝐹,𝑡 + 𝐿𝐸,𝑡)  (28)  
where 𝜙𝑡 = 𝜙(𝑋𝐵,𝑡) is a convex function with the following properties: the first derivative is 
𝜙′ < 0 and the second derivative is positive 𝜙′′ > 0. The first derivative implies that a higher 
excess capital reduces the cost of deviating from the required capital ratio, while the second 
derivative implies that a higher excess capital reduces the cost but at a decreasing rate. Using 
equations (27) and (28), the commercial bank’s excess capital can be rewritten as 
𝑋𝐵,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛾)�𝐿𝐹,𝑡 + 𝐿𝐸,𝑡� − 𝐷𝑡 (29) 
We now consider the commercial bank’s flow of funds. The expenditure side of the banker 
includes current consumption, the interest payment �𝑅𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
� 𝐷𝑡−1 to the financially unconstrained 
household, new loans to the financially constrained household 𝐿𝐹,𝑡 (household loans) and to the 
entrepreneur 𝐿𝐸,𝑡 (business loans), as well as the cost of deviating from the required capital ratio 
𝜙�𝑋𝐵,𝑡�. The flow of income includes the household deposits, the repayment of loans by the 
entrepreneur �𝑅𝐸,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
� 𝐿𝐸,𝑡−1 and the repayment of loans by the financially constrained household 
�
𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
� 𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1. However, the financially constrained household can default on the mortgage loans 
and the amount of mortgage defaults is 𝑍𝐹,𝑡. An increase in 𝑍𝐹,𝑡 has a negative impact on the 
banker’s flow of income. The constraint of her flow of funds is expressed as 
𝐶𝐵,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝐿𝐸,𝑡 + 𝐿𝐹,𝑡 + 𝜙�𝑋𝐵,𝑡� = 𝐷𝑡 + 𝑅𝐸,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐿𝐸,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1 − 𝑍𝐹,𝑡  (30) 
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The bank chooses 𝐶𝐵,𝑡, 𝐷𝑡 , 𝐿𝐸,𝑡, and 𝐿𝐹,𝑡 to maximize (26) subject to (10), (29) and (30). The 
first-order conditions are 
𝛽𝐵𝐸𝑡 �
𝑅𝑡
𝜋𝑡+1
� = 𝐸𝑡 �𝐶𝐵,𝑡+1𝐶𝐵,𝑡 � �1 + 𝜙′�𝑋𝐵,𝑡��  (31) 
𝛽𝐵𝐸𝑡 �
𝑅𝐸,𝑡
𝜋𝑡+1
� = 𝐸𝑡 �𝐶𝐵,𝑡+1𝐶𝐵,𝑡 � �1 + (1 − 𝛾)𝜙′�𝑋𝐵,𝑡��  (32) 
and 
𝛽𝐵𝐸𝑡 �
𝑅𝐹,𝑡
𝜋𝑡+1
� = 𝐸𝑡 �𝐶𝐵,𝑡+1𝐶𝐵,𝑡 � �1 + (1 − 𝛾)𝜙′�𝑋𝐵,𝑡�� + 𝛽𝐵𝐸𝑡 �𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡+1𝜕𝐿𝐹,𝑡 �  (33) 
Equation (31) defines the optimal holding of deposits, whilst equation (32) determines the 
optimal loan supply to the entrepreneur. Equation (33) determines the optimal loan supply to the 
financially constrained household. Therefore, the main difference between equation (32) and (33) 
is that the expected mortgage default channel 𝐸𝑡�𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡+1 𝜕𝐿𝐹,𝑡⁄ � is incorporated into the optimal 
loan supply for the financially constrained household. 
Furthermore, equation (32) implies that a rise in the bank’s excess capital reduces the cost of 
deviating from the capital ratio requirement, which in turn induces the bank to increase the loan 
supply. This effect leads to a decrease in the interest rate on business loans. In the absence of the 
capital requirement 𝛾 the interest rates on deposits and loans would be the same, and variations in 
the bank capital would have a small impact on the borrowing cost for the entrepreneur. Thus, a 
positive shock to house price expectations leads to an increase in the bank’s excess capital which 
in turn leads to a decline in interest rate on business loans. Then, equation (33) implies that an 
increase in the excess capital reduces the cost of deviating from the capital ratio requirement; 
thereby this reduction induces the banker to increase loans to the financially constrained 
household which leads to a decline in the interest rate on household loans. Consequently, a 
positive shock to house price expectations leads to an increase in bank capital and excess capital, 
that will lead to a decline in household loan rates given the expected mortgage defaults. On the 
other hand, for a given unit of houses an increase in the unit of loans to the financially 
constrained household leads to a rise in the expected mortgage defaults, and in turn dampens an 
expansion of the supply of loans to the financially constrained household and slows down the 
decline in the interest rate on household loans. 
In summary, the commercial bank’s lending decisions are influenced by the bank capital 
position which is affected by house prices. The commercial bank also takes into account the 
expected mortgage defaults when making loans to the financially constrained household. 
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3.5 Retailer 
We now turn to the retail sector which introduces price stickiness into the model (Iacoviello, 
2005). The model features a continuum of retailers indexed by 𝑧𝜖[0,1] where they transform an 
intermediate good into a final good. Each retailer 𝑧 purchases intermediate goods from 
entrepreneurs at a price 𝑃𝑡𝑊 and each retailer transforms them without cost into the differentiated 
goods 𝑌𝑡(𝑧), sold at a price 𝑃𝑡(𝑧). The differentiated goods are then aggregated into total final 
goods 𝑌𝑡 as such 
𝑌𝑡 = �∫ 𝑌𝑡(𝑧)(𝜀−1) 𝜀⁄ 𝑑𝑧10 �𝜀 (𝜀−1)⁄    (34) 
where 𝜀 > 1 is the price elasticity of demand for goods 𝑧. The aggregate price index 𝑃𝑡 is defined 
as 
𝑃𝑡 = �∫ 𝑃𝑡(𝑧)1−𝜀𝑑𝑧10 �1 (1−𝜀)⁄   (35) 
Each retailer faces the following demand curve 
𝑌𝑡(𝑧) = (𝑃𝑡(𝑧)/𝑃𝑡)−𝜀𝑌𝑡  (36) 
We assume that there is a Calvo price-setting mechanism and a retailer can set her price with 
probability (1 − 𝜃), and with 𝜃 must keep the price unchanged. 𝑃𝑡∗(𝑧) is the price that the retailer 
is able to change. Each retailer maximizes the following expected profit 
∑ 𝜃𝑘𝐸𝑡
∞
𝑘=0 ��Λ𝑡,𝑘 �𝑃𝑡∗(𝑧)𝑃𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑋𝑋𝑡+𝑘�� 𝑌𝑡+𝑘∗ (𝑧)�  (37) 
where 𝑌𝑡+𝑘∗ (𝑧) = (𝑃𝑡∗(𝑧)/𝑃𝑡+𝑘)−𝜀𝑌𝑡+𝑘. Recall that, the financially unconstrained household is the 
owner of the retail sector, therefore Λ𝑡,𝑘 = 𝛽𝑈 �𝐶𝑈,𝑡 𝐶𝑈,𝑡+𝑘⁄ � represents the financially 
unconstrained household’s stochastic discount factor. 𝑋𝑡 is the markup of final over intermediate 
goods and her steady state is 𝑋 = 𝜀 (𝜀 − 1)⁄ . The Calvo price evolves as 
𝑃𝑡 = [𝜃𝑃𝑡−1𝜀 + (1 − 𝜃)(𝑃𝑡∗)1−𝜀]𝜀 (1−𝜀)⁄   (38) 
Combining (37) and (38) and then log-linearizing, we obtain the following Phillips curve 
𝜋�𝑡 = 𝛽𝑈𝐸𝑡𝜋�𝑡+1 − 𝜅𝑋�𝑡  (39) 
where 𝜅 = (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝛽𝑈𝜃)/𝜃. Equation (39) indicates that inflation depends negatively on the 
markup 𝑋�𝑡 and positively on expected inflation.
8  
 
3.6 Central Bank 
The central bank follows a Taylor rule that reacts to inflation, output and household credit growth 
𝑅�𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑅�𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑖) �𝜌𝜋𝜋�𝑡 + 𝜌𝑦𝑌�𝑡 + 𝜌𝐹�𝐿�𝐹,𝑡 − 𝐿�𝐹,𝑡−1��  (40) 
                                                 
8 The  (^) “hat” variables denote percentage changes from the steady state. 
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where 0 ≤ 𝜌𝑖 ≤ 1 is the parameter associated with interest rate inertia and 𝜌𝜋 ≥ 0, 𝜌𝑦 ≥ 0 and 
𝜌𝐹 ≥ 0 measure the response of the policy rate to current inflation, output and household credit 
growth respectively. Equation (40) is referred to as an augmented Taylor rule, in which the 
central bank reacts to the deviations of inflation from its steady state, the deviations of output 
from its steady state and household credit growth. With 𝜌𝐹 = 0, we have a standard Taylor rule 
where the central bank reacts to inflation and output. 
 
4. STOCHASTIC PROCESSES 
In this section we discuss the stochastic processes associated with a shock to house price 
expectations. A house price expectation shock can be defined as a shift in expectations about 
future house prices. In our paper, house price expectation shocks only affect financially 
constrained households and the main reasons are as follows: firstly, as Piazzesi and Schneider 
(2009) report, there is a heterogeneity in households’ view about the housing market so there is a 
cluster of households that believe it is a good time to purchase a house because they believe 
house prices will rise in the future. Households’ optimism reflects changes in their house price 
expectations and some of the households are more optimistic than others. Motivated by Piazzesi 
and Schneider (2009), we assume that households have different perspectives about future price 
increases. Hence, we model financially constrained households to be optimistic about price 
appreciations by incorporating expectation shocks to the financially constrained households’ 
housing demand equation. Note that unconstrained households are not directly affected by house 
price expectation shocks. Secondly, the fact that house price expectation shocks only affect the 
financially constrained households, creates a housing market boom and a credit boom and at the 
same time a period of low inflation in our model simulations; this is better demonstrated in the 
relevant section where we also outline how this outcome has important ramifications for 
macroeconomic and financial stability. 
In particular, the stochastic process of a house price expectation shock 𝜀𝑡 follows an AR(1) 
process: 𝑙𝑛𝜀𝑡 = 𝜌𝑞𝑙𝑛𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑞,𝑡, where 0 < 𝜌𝑞 < 1 and 𝑢𝑞,𝑡 follows a white noise process with 
mean zero and variance 𝜎𝑞2. The shock is incorporated into the financially constrained household 
housing demand equation. In fact, the housing demand equation (14) now is rewritten as 
𝑞𝑡
𝐶𝐹,𝑡 = 𝜈ℎ𝐻𝐹,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 �𝜀𝑡𝑞𝑡+1𝐶𝐹,𝑡+1� + 𝜆𝐹,𝑡𝑚𝐹𝐸𝑡(𝜀𝑡𝑞𝑡+1) + 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 � 1𝐶𝐹,𝑡+1 𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡+1𝜕𝐻𝐹,𝑡 �  (41) 
and the expected mortgage default becomes 
𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡+1
𝜕𝐻𝐹,𝑡 = − 𝑓2𝐻𝐹,𝑡 � 𝑅𝐹,𝑡𝐿𝐹,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1𝜀𝑡𝑞𝑡+1𝐻𝐹,𝑡 − (1 − 𝜔�)��𝑅𝐹,𝑡𝐿𝐹,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 � 
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−
𝑓2𝐻𝐹,𝑡 � 𝑅𝐹,𝑡𝐿𝐹,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1𝜀𝑡𝑞𝑡+1𝐻𝐹,𝑡 − (1 − 𝜔�)� (1 − 𝜔�)�𝜀𝑡𝑞𝑡+1𝐻𝐹,𝑡� < 0 
Equation (41) implies that a shock to expected future house prices will have a direct impact on 
the demand for housing through the expected resale value of the house 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 �
𝜀𝑡𝑞𝑡+1
𝐶𝐹,𝑡+1�, the 
expected collateral value 𝜆𝐹,𝑡𝑚𝐹𝐸𝑡(𝜀𝑡𝑞𝑡+1) and the expected mortgage default channel 
𝐸𝑡�𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡+1 𝜕𝐻𝐹,𝑡⁄ �. 
 
5. CALIBRATION AND PARAMETERIZATION 
We calibrate the baseline model to match U.S. data, thus most of the values of model parameters 
are derived by Iacoviello (2005) and Finocchiaro and Heideken (2013). The model economy is 
log-linearized around its deterministic steady state. Table 2 summarizes the calibration.  
The financially unconstrained household’s discount factor 𝛽𝑈 is set to 0.9925 to obtain a 
steady-state interest rate on deposits 𝑅 approximately 3 % on annual basis. We set the financially 
constrained household’s discount factor 𝛽𝐹 and the entrepreneur’s discount factor 𝛽𝐸 to 0.95, 
which is smaller than the financially unconstrained household’s discount factor, because i) we 
want the financially constrained household and the entrepreneur to borrow in equilibrium and ii) 
the collateral constraints to be binding. 
The value of the weight on housing in the households’ utility function 𝜈ℎ is set to 0.0905, 
which implies that the ratio of residential housing to annual output is approximately 145 % in line 
with the U.S. utilized dataset. The housing share 𝜈 in the production function is set to 0.104 i.e., 
so that the ratio of commercial real estate to annual output of 70 % remains in line with the U.S. 
data as well. The household loan-to-value (LTV) ratio 𝑚𝐹 is 0.83, and the business LTV ratio 𝑚𝐸 
is set to 0.64. These values indicate that the household sector is more leveraged than the business 
sector, as documented in Cecchetti et al. (2011). The values of the banking parameters are based 
on Kollmann et al. (2011). The discount factor of banker 𝛽𝐵 is set to 0.97, the cost parameter 𝜙′′ 
to 0.25, while the bank capital ratio 𝛾 is set to 0.05 in accordance with the empirical findings of 
D’Hulster (2009), that the capital ratios of the major European and U.S. investment banks range 
between 3 % and 5 % over the period 1995 - 2010. Furthermore, following D’Hulster (2009) the 
U.S. regulator recommends a minimum leverage ratio of 5 % in order for a bank to be considered 
well-capitalized prior to the financial crisis. 
The parameter on the magnitude of losses 𝜔� is set to 0.61 to obtain a steady-state interest rate 
on household loans 𝑅𝐹 of approximately 5 % on annual basis. The higher 𝜔� is, it will increase the 
magnitude of mortgage defaults in the steady state, thus increase the steady-state interest rate on 
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household loans. 𝑓 measures the sensitivity of the mortgage default to housing prices. A higher 𝑓 
will make mortgage defaults more sensitive to house prices. We set 𝑓 to 0.83, which implies that 
the annual mortgage default rate is approximately 2.5 %, in line with U.S. evidence (Forlati and 
Lambertini, 2011). Recall that the deposit rate 𝑅 is approximately 3 % annually. The lending rate 
on household loans 𝑅𝐹 is higher than the deposit rate 𝑅 because the parameters that capture the 
possibility of default (𝜔� and 𝑓) are included in the interest rate on household loans. The 
annualized steady-state interest rate on business loans (i.e., the interest rate for lending to 
entrepreneurs) 𝑅𝐸 is approximately 3.12 %, which is slightly higher than the deposit rate because 
this lending rate on business loans does not include the possibility of default.  
We already mentioned that monetary policy reacts to quarterly inflation and output. So, for the 
monetary policy parameters we set 𝜌𝑖 = 0.7, 𝜌𝑦 = 0.125, and 𝜌𝜋 = 1.8, based on the U.S. 
estimated values indicated by Finocchiaro and Heideken (2013). Under the standard Taylor rule, 
we set 𝜌𝐹 = 0. In the next section, we vary the credit growth coefficient in the augmented Taylor 
rule. According to our data, the autocorrelations of the linearly detrended U.S. real house prices 
are approximately 0.95. Thereby, we set the persistence of the house price expectation shock 𝜌𝑞  
to 0.95. 
 
6. MODEL SIMULATIONS 
We simulate the response of the economy to a positive shock to house price expectations. Figure 
3 shows the impulse response functions to a positive house price expectation shock. All values 
are expressed in percentage deviations from steady state values, and one period represents one 
quarter in this model. The central bank follows a standard Taylor rule in which the policy rate 
responds to inflation and output. Total consumption comprises consumption of financially 
unconstrained households, financially constrained households, entrepreneurs and the banker. For 
illustrative purpose, we set an one-standard deviation shock to house price expectations. Figure 3 
shows that a positive house price expectation shock yields an increase in total consumption, 
investment, employment, housing demand, household loans, household debt, business loans and 
bank leverage ratio, whereas it yields a reduction in inflation, mortgage default rate, interest rates 
on household and business loans. 
A rise in expectations about future house prices induces financially constrained households to 
increase their demand for housing, also triggering a rise in household loans and household debt. 
The rise in expected future house prices relaxes the collateral constraint, which further 
encourages the financially constrained households to borrow more, leading to even higher 
household debt. 
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The increase in expected future house prices leads to a rise in current house prices and a boom. 
The rise in current house prices increases the value of houses beyond the household debt, and as a 
result the mortgage default rate declines. This is consistent with the empirical evidence shown in 
section 2. The increase in current house prices expands the commercial bank’s balance sheet by 
increasing the value of bank assets (household and business loans) relative to the liabilities 
(household deposits). The positive house price expectation shock generates a rise in bank assets 
and leverage ratio (i.e., bank assets to capital ratio). The rise in house prices leads to a rise in 
bank capital and the bank’s excess capital, which in turn both reduce the cost of deviating from 
the capital to asset ratio requirement. This effect induces the bank to increase loans to the 
business sector, hence accordingly the interest rate on business loans decline. Likewise, the rise 
in bank capital and the excess capital leads the commercial bank to increase loans to financially 
constrained households, which in turn causes a decline in the interest rate on household loans. On 
the other hand, a rise in the amount of loans to financially constrained households augments the 
expected mortgage defaults given the housing stock. The bank takes into account the expected 
mortgage defaults when making a decision on lending to financially constrained households. 
Consequently, a grow in the defaults tends to dampen down the expansion of loans to financially 
constrained households and weakens the decline of interest rates on household loans. 
The interplay between the household and the banking sector occurs through the house price 
and expected mortgage default channels. The increase in house prices causes the interest rate on 
household loans to decrease, while the rise in expected mortgage defaults boosts the interest rates 
on loans to financially constrained households. Interestingly, the house price channel is stronger 
than the expected mortgage default one, and as a result the interest rate on household loans 
declines. Moreover, the rise in expected future house prices induces financially constrained 
households to cut consumption goods and leisure to invest more in housing. Nonetheless, 
financially unconstrained households consume more, increase leisure and buy less houses. As 
house prices increase, the collateral constraints of entrepreneurs are relaxed, which in turn 
induces the entrepreneurs to increase investment and consumption. Also, business loans and 
business debt both increase, and total consumption rises during a house price boom as well. 
Now we discuss the effect of a shock to house price expectations on inflation dynamics. The 
response of inflation rate is negative and persistent. Notably, it is the desire to invest in housing 
that causes financially constrained households to cut consumption of goods and leisure so as to 
invest more. The increase in the labor supply by financially constrained households leads to a rise 
in total employment, that creates downward pressure on the wage rate and the marginal cost of 
production. This outcome leads to an increase in the markup of final goods over intermediate 
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goods and places downward pressure on inflation. An increase in the markup tends to put 
downward pressure on inflation indicated by equation (39), which describes the Phillips curve. 
Thus, a positive shock creates a negative response in inflation. The central bank responds to a 
decline in inflation by lowering the policy rate, which leads to lower loan rates and in turn 
encourages financially constrained households to take on more debt. Hence, the lower policy rate 
may increase the risk of financial crisis and instability, in that the economy becomes more 
sensitive to shocks to house price expectations and a collapse of house prices. 
In conclusion, our results complement the study of Christiano et al. (2010), who show that it is 
possible for a DSGE model to generate a fall in inflation while the economy experiences a stock 
market boom. In their model, firms receive a signal about a new cost-saving technology that will 
be available in the future. The anticipation of the new technology leads to an increase in 
investment and a boom in stock prices because firms believe this new technology will improve 
production and lower the marginal cost of production. The fall in the marginal cost of production 
creates downward pressure on inflation. In our setup, we showed that a positive shock to house 
price expectations yields an increase in house prices (a housing market boom) and a decline in 
inflation at the same time. 
 
7. HOUSE PRICE EXPECTATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY 
This section discusses house price expectation shocks and their implications for monetary policy. 
In particular, we investigate whether monetary policy reacting to household credit growth can 
dampen the responses of the economy to house price expectation shocks and reduce the volatility 
of output and inflation. We conduct two exercises: in the first one, we compare the responses of 
the economy under the standard Taylor rule, and under the augmented Taylor rule wherein the 
central bank reacts to household credit growth. Under the standard Taylor rule regime, the central 
bank reacts to the deviations of inflation and output from their steady state. Under the augmented 
Taylor rule, the central bank reacts to the deviations of inflation and output from their steady 
state, yet also from household credit growth. For illustrative purposes, under the augmented 
Taylor rule, the household credit growth coefficient 𝜌𝐹 in the generalized rule equation (40) is set 
to be greater than zero, i.e., 0.15. In the second exercise, we vary the household credit growth 
coefficient in the Taylor rule between 0 and 2. We apply a Monte Carlo simulation method where 
our model is simulated 20000 times, and compute the standard deviations for output and inflation. 
 
7.1 First Exercise 
Figure 4 shows the responses of the economy under the two different Taylor rule cases. 
Specifically, the solid line demonstrates the responses to a positive house price expectation shock 
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under the standard monetary policy, whilst the dashed one illustrates the responses under the 
augmented Taylor rule with credit growth. Under the standard rule, the central bank observes a 
downward pressure on inflation and responds to the shock to house price expectations by 
reducing the policy rate. However, under the augmented Taylor rule (the central bank reacts to 
household credit growth), the policy rate path is higher than the one of the standard rule. By 
taking into account household credit growth, monetary policy weakens the response of economic 
activity to the real estate expectation shock. Further, the reaction of the central bank to the credit 
growth leads to an even lower inflation rate because of a fall in aggregate demand in the short-
run. Taking household credit growth into account, moderates bank lending activities, a fact which 
curbs the housing demand and dampens the rise in household debt and bank leverage ratio. 
 
7.2 Second Exercise 
We now compare the standard deviations of output and inflation under the two Taylor rule cases. 
Figure 5 displays the standard deviations of output for different values of the household credit 
growth coefficient, and Figure 6 shows the standard deviations of inflation. Both figures show 
that as the response of monetary policy to household credit growth increases, the output volatility 
decreases whereas inflation volatility increases. An advantage of monetary policy reacting to 
household credit growth, is that it reduces the output volatility. Moreover, monetary policy that 
incorporates household credit growth, slows down the rise in household debt and the bank 
leverage ratio, i.e., improves financial stability. Nevertheless, the disadvantage is that inflation 
volatility rises and the central bank is likely to miss the inflation target in the short run. In 
summary, taking household credit growth into account reduces the volatility of output and 
improves financial stability, but worsens price stability. 
 
8. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
We conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to house price expectation shocks and infer upon 
their implications for monetary policy. In the previous section, under the standard and augmented 
Taylor rule, the central bank reacts to the deviations of output from its steady state. Now we 
examine whether the output volatility decreases and inflation volatility increases when the central 
bank reacts to output growth, instead of deviations of output from its steady state. Under the 
standard Taylor rule regime, the central bank reacts to the deviations of inflation from its steady 
state and output growth, whereas in case of the augmented Taylor rule, the central bank reacts to 
the deviations of inflation from steady state, output growth and household credit growth. As 
previously, we vary the household credit growth coefficient in the Taylor rule between 0 and 2. 
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Similarly, the model is simulated for 20000 times and then we estimate the standard deviations 
for output and inflation. 
Figure 7 depicts the standard deviations of output for different values of the household credit 
growth coefficient and Figure 8 presents the standard deviations of inflation. Those figures 
indicate that as the response of monetary policy to household credit growth rises, the output 
volatility declines and inflation volatility increases. Based on both previous and present sections, 
we may safely conclude that monetary policy incorporating household credit growth improves 
macroeconomic stability, dampens the credit boom, yet it jeopardizes price stability. 
 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
We contribute to the literature by embedding two features rarely encountered in DSGE models 
with housing collaterals, namely shocks to house price expectations, and endogenous mortgage 
defaults. We find that a rise in expected future house prices leads to an increase in house prices, 
housing demand, household debt, business debt, bank leverage ratio, aggregate consumption, 
investment, employment and output, whereas it leads to a decline in mortgage default rates and 
interest rates on loans and inflation. 
As opposed to Iacoviello (2015) who models mortgage defaults as exogenous shocks, we 
address endogenous defaults on mortgages. Specifically, in our model financially constrained 
households default when the value of their houses is lower than the mortgage loan repayment. 
Moreover, contrary to Forlati and Lambertini (2011) who consider that variations in mortgage 
defaults depend on variations in mortgage risk, we show that mortgage defaults depend on 
variations in expected future house prices. The results from our DSGE model simulations 
illustrate that an increase in expected future house prices leads to a rise in house prices, which 
causes a decline in mortgage default rates. Our results are consistent with econometric evidence. 
Additionally, Forlati and Lambertini (2011) demonstrate that variations in mortgage risk generate 
a weak persistence in house prices as well as in aggregate consumption and output. They also 
indicate that house prices, aggregate consumption and output deviate from the steady state and 
then rapidly rebound. Instead, in our model, a shock to house price expectations produces strong 
persistence in house prices, aggregate consumption and output, in accordance with the empirical 
VAR study by Towbin and Weber (2015). 
Furthermore, we show that a rise in expected future house prices leads to a fall in inflation and 
a rise in current house prices, simultaneously. Hence, our finding complements the work of 
Christiano et al. (2010), in that optimistic expectations about future technology lead to a fall in 
inflation and a rise in stock prices. Bernanke and Gertler (2000) report that stock prices tend to be 
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high during an inflationary period. Also, Forlati and Lambertini (2011) confirm that a drop in 
mortgage risk entails a rise in house prices and inflation. The findings reported by Bernanke and 
Gertler (2000) and Forlati and Lambertini (2011) have different ramifications for monetary policy 
and financial stability compared to our results. In their works, the central bank reacts to upward 
pressure on inflation by increasing the policy rate. This reaction may reduce financial instability 
by dampening an increase in leverage in the economy, so that the economy becomes less 
sensitive to disturbances. Based on our setting, the central bank reacts to downward pressure on 
inflation by cutting the policy rate. This reaction amplifies the rise in housing demand, household 
debt and bank leverage ratio, therefore increases financial instability. Thus, the highly-leveraged 
economy is more vulnerable to a collapse in house prices.  
Finally, we explore whether monetary policy that takes into account household credit growth 
can improve macroeconomic stability and contribute to financial stability. We find that monetary 
policy responding to household credit growth reduces the volatility of output, but increases the 
volatility of inflation. By reacting to household credit growth, monetary policy dampens the rise 
in housing demand, household debt and bank leverage ratio. Consequently, this reaction may 
reduce the sensitivity of the economy to shocks to the housing market. Overall, monetary policy 
that reacts to household credit growth improves the stability of the real economy and enhances 
financial stability, albeit it jeopardizes price stability in the short-run as inflation deviates further 
from its target. 
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TABLE 1: GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST BETWEEN HOUSE PRICES AND MORTGAGE DEFAULTS 
 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob  
Real house prices do not 
Granger cause mortgage 
defaults 
 
5.99786 
 
 
0.0003 
 
 
 
Mortgage defaults do not 
Granger cause real house 
prices 
1.91080 
 
0.1158 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: CALIBRATION 
 
Parameter Description Value 
   
𝛽𝑈 Unconstrained household’s discount factor 0.9925 
   
𝛽𝐹 Constrained household’s discount factor 0.95 
   
𝛽𝐸 Entrepreneur’s discount factor 0.95 
   
𝛽𝐵 Banker’s discount factor 0.97 
   
𝛾 Required bank capital ratio 0.05 
   
𝜂 Labor supply aversion 1.01 
 
𝛼 Share of unconstrained household’s labor income 0.59 
   
𝜈ℎ Weight of housing in household’s utility function 0.0905 
   
𝜈 Housing share in the production function 0.104 
 
𝜇 
 
Capital share in the production function 0.3 
   
𝛿 Depreciation rate of physical capital 0.03 
   
𝜓𝑘 Capital adjustment cost 0.81 
   
𝜃 Probability fixed prices 0.75 
   
𝑚𝐹 Loan-to-value household 0.83 
   
𝑚𝐸 Loan-to-value entrepreneur 0.64 
   
𝜔� Magnitude of losses 0.61 
   
𝜙′′ Cost of deviation from the required capital ratio 0.25 
 
 
27 
 
   
𝑓 Sensitivity of the mortgage default to house prices 0.83 
   
𝜌𝑦 Taylor rule output parameter 0.125 
   
𝜌𝜋 Taylor rule inflation parameter 1.8 
   
𝜌𝑖 
 
Taylor rule interest rate parameter 0.7 
𝜌𝑞 Persistence of house price expectation shock 0.95 
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FIGURE 1: U.S. REAL HOUSE PRICE INDEX 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The data source is Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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FIGURE 2: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A HOUSE PRICE SHOCK 
 
 
 
Notes: The impulse responses are estimated via the Cholesky decomposition method, and are displayed with one S.D 
Innovations ± 2 SE.    
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FIGURE 3: RESPONSES OF THE ECONOMY TO A HOUSE PRICE EXPECTATION SHOCK 
 
FIGURE 3A 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
FIGURE 3C 
 
 
FIGURE 3D 
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FIGURE 3E 
 
 
Notes: The IRFs are depicted in case of a house price expectation shock. FUCH denotes financially unconstrained 
household, while FCH represents a financially constrained household. 
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FIGURE 4: HOUSE PRICE EXPECTATIONS AND MONETARY POLICY 
 
FIGURE 4A 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4B 
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FIGURE 4C 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid line shows the responses of the economy to a positive house price expectation shock under the 
standard monetary policy. The dashed line shows the reaction of the economy under the augmented Taylor rule with 
credit growth. 
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FIGURE 5: STANDARD DEVIATION OF OUTPUT 
 
 
 
Notes: The central bank reacts to the deviations of inflation from its steady state, the deviations of output from 
steady state and to household credit growth. 
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FIGURE 6: STANDARD DEVIATION OF INFLATION 
 
 
Notes: The central bank reacts to the deviations of inflation from its steady state, the deviations of output from its 
steady state, and household credit growth. 
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FIGURE 7: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF OUTPUT 
 
 
Notes: The central bank reacts to the deviations of inflation from its steady state, output growth and from household 
credit growth. 
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FIGURE 8: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF INFLATION 
 
 
Notes: The central bank reacts to the deviations of inflation from its steady state, output growth and household credit 
growth. 
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APPENDIX I: TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION 
I.1 DEBT DEFAULTS 
This section presents the full derivations of the mortgage default. A financially constrained 
household can default on mortgages. The household consists of many members 𝑖 who all 
purchase houses 𝐻𝐹,𝑡𝑖 . The total stock of the household is 𝐻𝐹,𝑡 = ∫ 𝐻𝐹,𝑡𝑖1𝑖=0 𝑑𝑖. All members buy 
houses of the same size 𝐻𝐹,𝑡𝑖 = 𝐻𝐹,𝑡. In every period, each member’s house value is subject to an 
idiosyncratic iid shock 𝜔𝑖 such that the house value becomes 𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡𝑖 (1 + 𝜔𝑖). The household 
member 𝑖 defaults when the value of the house is lower than the mortgage loan repayment 
𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1 > 𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1(1 + 𝜔𝑖). Let 𝜔� be the threshold value of the shock for which the 
member will pay back the mortgages 𝜔� = 𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − 1. If the household member 𝑖 draws 𝜔 
lower than 𝜔�, the member will default. Let −𝜔� be the lower bound of the distribution where 
𝜔� > 0. We assume that 𝜔� is always larger than −𝜔�, thus there are always some defaults. The 
amount of mortgage defaults 𝑍𝐹,𝑡 is determined by the following integral 
𝑍𝐹,𝑡 = � �𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 − 𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1(1 + 𝜔)�
�
𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 �−1
−𝜔�
𝑓(𝜔)𝑑𝜔 
To simplify, we assume that 𝑓(𝜔) is constant in the interval −𝜔� < 𝜔 < 𝜔� such that 𝑓(𝜔) = 𝑓. 
Therefore, the following integration becomes 
� �
𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
− 𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1(1 + 𝜔)��
𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 �−1
−𝜔�
𝑓(𝜔)𝑑𝜔 
= ��𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
− 𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1�𝜔 − 𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 𝜔22 �
𝜔�
�
𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 �−1
𝑓𝑑𝜔 
= 𝑓 �𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
− 𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1� �𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − 1� 
−
𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1𝑓2 �𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − 1�2 + ��𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 − 𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1�𝜔� − 𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡 𝜔�22 � 𝑓 = 𝑓𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 ��𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − 1�2 − 12 �𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − 1�2�  +𝑓𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 ��𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − 1�𝜔� + 𝜔�22 � 
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= 𝑓𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−12 ��𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − 1�2 + 2�𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − 1�𝜔� + 𝜔�2� 
= 𝑓𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−12 ��𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − 1�2 − 2(1 − 𝜔�)�𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 � + (1 −𝜔�)2� 
This calculation provides the following amount of mortgage defaults 
𝑍𝐹,𝑡 = 𝑓 𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−12 �𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − (1 − 𝜔�)�2 
 
I.2 FINANCIALLY UNCONSTRAINED HOUSEHOLD 
The utility function of a financially unconstrained household is 
𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝑈 𝑡∞𝑡=0 �𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑈,𝑡 + 𝜈ℎ𝑙𝑛𝐻𝑈,𝑡 − �𝑁𝑈,𝑡�𝜂+1𝜂+1 �  (I.1) 
The financially unconstrained household maximizes its utility subject to the following budget 
constraint 
𝐶𝑈,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡�𝐻𝑈,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑈,𝑡−1� = 𝑅𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝑊𝑈,𝑡𝑁𝑈,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡  (I.2) 
The Lagrangian for the financially unconstrained household is 
Γ = 𝐸0� 𝛽𝑈 𝑡∞
𝑡=0
�𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑈,𝑡 + 𝜈ℎ𝑙𝑛𝐻𝑈,𝑡 − �𝑁𝑈,𝑡�𝜂+1𝜂 + 1 � 
+𝜇𝑈,𝑡 �𝑅𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝑊𝑈,𝑡𝑁𝑈,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡 − 𝐶𝑈,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡 − 𝑞𝑡�𝐻𝑈,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑈,𝑡−1�� 
The first-order conditions with respect to 𝐶𝑈,𝑡, 𝐷𝑡 , 𝐻𝑈,𝑡, and 𝑁𝑈,𝑡 are as follows respectively 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝐶𝑈,𝑡 = 1𝐶𝑈,𝑡 − 𝜇𝑈,𝑡 = 0  (I.3) 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝐷𝑡
= 𝛽𝑈𝐸𝑡 �𝜇𝑈,𝑡+1 𝑅𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� − 𝜇𝑈,𝑡 = 0   (I.4) 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝐻𝑈,𝑡 = 𝜈ℎ𝐻𝑈,𝑡 − 𝜇𝑈,𝑡𝑞𝑡 + 𝛽𝑈𝐸𝑡�𝜇𝑈,𝑡+1𝑞𝑡+1� = 0  (I.5) 
and 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝑁𝑈,𝑡 = −�𝑁𝑈,𝑡�𝜂 + 𝜇𝑈,𝑡𝑊𝑈,𝑡 = 0  (I.6) 
Combining equations (I.3) and (I.4), we obtain the Euler consumption equation, which can be 
written as 
1
𝐶𝑈,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑈𝐸𝑡 � 1𝐶𝑈,𝑡+1 𝑅𝑡𝜋𝑡+1�  (I.7) 
Jointly from equations (I.3) and (I.5), we obtain the following housing demand equation 
 
 
41 
 
𝑞𝑡
𝐶𝑈,𝑡 = 𝜈ℎ𝐻𝑈,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑈𝐸𝑡 � 𝑞𝑡+1𝐶𝑈,𝑡+1�  (I.8) 
From equations (I.3) and (I.6), we obtain the following labor supply equation 
𝑊𝑈,𝑡
𝐶𝑈,𝑡 = 𝑁𝑈,𝑡𝜂   (I.9) 
 
I.3 FINANCIALLY CONSTRAINED HOUSEHOLD 
The utility function of a financially constrained household is  
𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝐹 𝑡∞𝑡=0 �𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐹,𝑡 + 𝜈ℎ𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐹,𝑡 − �𝑁𝐹,𝑡�𝜂+1𝜂+1 �  (I.10) 
The financially constrained household maximizes its utility subject to the constraints 
𝐶𝐹,𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡�𝐻𝐹,𝑡 − 𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1� + 𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1 − 𝑍𝐹,𝑡 = 𝐿𝐹,𝑡 + 𝑊𝐹,𝑡𝑁𝐹,𝑡  (I.11) 
𝐸𝑡 �
𝑅𝐹,𝑡
𝜋𝑡+1
� 𝐿𝐹,𝑡 ≤ 𝑚𝐹𝐸𝑡�𝑞𝑡+1𝐻𝐹,𝑡�  (I.12) 
and 
𝑍𝐹,𝑡 = 𝑓 𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−12 �𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − (1 − 𝜔�)�2  (I.13) 
The financially constrained household maximizes its utility (I.10) subject to the budget constraint 
(I.11), the collateral constraint (I.12) and the mortgage default condition (I.13). The Lagrangian 
for the financially unconstrained household is 
Γ = 𝐸0� 𝛽𝑈 𝑡∞
𝑡=0
�𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐹,𝑡 + 𝜈𝐹𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐹,𝑡 − �𝑁𝐹,𝑡�𝜂+1𝜂 + 1 � +𝜇𝐹,𝑡 �𝐿𝐹,𝑡 + 𝑊𝐹,𝑡𝑁𝐹,𝑡 + 𝑍𝐹,𝑡 − 𝐶𝐹,𝑡 − 𝑞𝑡�𝐻𝐹,𝑡 − 𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1� − 𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1� +𝜆𝐹,𝑡 �𝑚𝐹𝐸𝑡�𝑞𝑡+1𝐻𝐹,𝑡� − 𝐸𝑡 �𝑅𝐹,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� 𝐿𝐹,𝑡� 
The first order conditions with respect to 𝐶𝐹,𝑡, 𝐷𝑡, 𝐻𝐹,𝑡 and 𝑁𝐹,𝑡 are respectively 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝐶𝐹,𝑡 = 1𝐶𝐹,𝑡 − 𝜇𝐹,𝑡 = 0 (I.14) 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝐿𝐹,𝑡 = 𝜇𝐹,𝑡 − 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 �𝜇𝐹,𝑡+1 𝑅𝐹,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� − 𝜆𝐹,𝑡𝐸𝑡 �𝑅𝐹,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� +𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 �𝜇𝐹,𝑡+1 𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡+1𝜕𝐿𝐹,𝑡 � = 0  (I.15) 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝐻𝐹,𝑡 = 𝜈ℎ𝐻𝐹,𝑡 − 𝜇𝐹,𝑡𝑞𝑡 + 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡�𝜇𝐹,𝑡+1𝑞𝑡+1� +𝜆𝐹,𝑡𝑚𝐹𝐸𝑡�𝑞𝑡+1𝐻𝐹,𝑡� + 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 �𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡+1𝜕𝐻𝐹,𝑡 � = 0   (I.16) 
and 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝑁𝐹,𝑡 = −�𝑁𝐹,𝑡�𝜂 + 𝜇𝐹,𝑡𝑊𝑈,𝑡 = 0 (I.17) 
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From equations (I.14) and (I.15), we attain the following Euler consumption equation with 
collateral and mortgage default channels 
1
𝐶𝐹,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 � 1𝐶𝐹,𝑡+1 𝑅𝐹,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� + 𝜆𝐹,𝑡𝐸𝑡 �𝑅𝐹,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� − 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 � 1𝐶𝐹,𝑡+1 𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡+1𝜕𝐿𝐹,𝑡 �   (I.18) 
Furthermore, combining equations (I.14) and (I.16) we obtain the housing demand equation with 
collateral channel 
𝑞𝑡
𝐶𝐹,𝑡 = 𝜈ℎ𝐻𝐹,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 � 𝑞𝑡+1𝐶𝐹,𝑡+1� + 𝑚𝐹𝐸𝑡�𝜆𝐹,𝑡𝑞𝑡+1� + 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝑡 � 1𝐶𝐹,𝑡+1 𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡+1𝜕𝐻𝐹,𝑡 �  (I.19) 
Additionally, from equations (I.14) and (I.17), we set the labor supply equation, written as 
𝑊𝐹,𝑡
𝐶𝐹,𝑡 = 𝑁𝐹,𝑡𝜂  (I.20) 
 
I.4 ENTREPRENEUR 
An entrepreneur has the following objective function 
𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝐸 𝑡∞𝑡=0 �𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐸,𝑡�  (I.21) 
She maximizes its objective function (I.21) subject to the following constraints 
𝑌𝐸,𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡−1𝜇 𝐻𝐸,𝑡−1𝜈 𝑁𝑈,𝑡𝛼(1−𝜇−𝜈)𝑁𝐹,𝑡(1−𝛼)(1−𝜇−𝜈)  (I.22) 
𝐶𝐸,𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡�𝐻𝐸,𝑡 − 𝐻𝐸,𝑡−1� + 𝑅𝐸,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐿𝐸,𝑡−1 + 𝑊𝑈,𝑡𝑁𝑈,𝑡 + 𝑊𝐹,𝑡𝑁𝐹,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜉𝐾,𝑡 = 𝑌𝐸,𝑡
𝑋𝑡
+ 𝐿𝐸,𝑡  (I.23) 
where 𝜉𝐾,𝑡 = (𝜓𝑘 2𝛿⁄ ) � 𝐼𝑡𝐾𝑡−1 − 𝛿�2 𝐾𝑡−1 
𝐾𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡  (I.24) 
and 
𝐸𝑡 �
𝑅𝐸,𝑡
𝜋𝑡+1
� 𝐿𝐸,𝑡 ≤ 𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑡�𝑞𝑡+1𝐻𝐸,𝑡� (I.25) 
The Lagrangian is 
Γ = 𝐸0� 𝛽𝐹 𝑡∞
𝑡=0
�𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐸,𝑡� +𝜇𝐸,𝑡 �𝑌𝐸,𝑡𝑋𝑡 + 𝐿𝐸,𝑡 − 𝐶𝐸,𝑡 − 𝑞𝑡�𝐻𝐸,𝑡 − 𝐻𝐸,𝑡−1� − 𝑅𝐸,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐿𝐸,𝑡−1 −𝑊𝑈,𝑡𝑁𝑈,𝑡 − 𝑊𝐹,𝑡𝑁𝐹,𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡 −
𝜉𝐾,𝑡�+𝜆𝐸,𝑡 �𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑡�𝑞𝑡+1𝐻𝐸,𝑡� − 𝐸𝑡 �𝑅𝐸,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� 𝐿𝐸,𝑡� 
The entrepreneur chooses 𝐶𝐸,𝑡, 𝐿𝐸,𝑡, 𝐾𝑡, 𝐼𝑡, 𝑁𝑈,𝑡, 𝑁𝐹,𝑡, and 𝐻𝐸,𝑡.The first-order conditions are as 
follows 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝐶𝐸,𝑡 = 1𝐶𝐹,𝑡 − 𝜇𝐸,𝑡 = 0 (I.26) 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝐿𝐸,𝑡 = 𝜇𝐸,𝑡 − 𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡 �𝜇𝐸,𝑡+1 𝑅𝐸,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� − 𝜆𝐸,𝑡𝐸𝑡 �𝑅𝐸,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� = 0  (I.27) 
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𝜕Γ
𝜕𝐻𝐸,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡 �𝜇𝐸,𝑡+1 �𝜈 𝑌𝐸,𝑡+1𝑋𝑡+1𝐻𝐸,𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡+1�� + 𝑚𝐸𝜆𝐸,𝑡𝐸𝑡(𝑞𝑡+1) = 0  (I.28) 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝐾𝑡
= 𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡 �𝜇𝐸,𝑡+1 �𝜓𝑘𝛿 �𝐼𝑡+1𝐾𝑡 − 𝛿� 𝐼𝑡+1𝐾𝑡 − 𝜓𝑘2𝛿 �𝐼𝑡+1𝐾𝑡 − 𝛿�2�� +𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡 �𝜇𝐸,𝑡+1 𝜇𝑌𝐸,𝑡+1𝑋𝑡+1𝐾𝑡 + 𝜇𝐸,𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿)� − 𝜇𝐸,𝑡 = 0  (I.29) 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝐼𝑡
= 𝜇𝐸,𝑡 �1 + 𝜓𝑘𝛿 � 𝐼𝑡𝐾𝑡−1 − 𝛿�� − 𝜇𝐸,𝑡 = 0  (I.30) 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝑁𝑈,𝑡 = 𝜇𝐸,𝑡𝛼(1 − 𝜇 − 𝜈) 𝑌𝐸,𝑡𝑋𝑡𝑁𝑈,𝑡 − 𝜇𝐸,𝑡𝑊𝑈,𝑡 = 0, (I.31) 
and 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝑁𝐹,𝑡 = 𝜇𝐸,𝑡(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜇 − 𝜈) 𝑌𝐸,𝑡𝑋𝑡𝑁𝐹,𝑡 − 𝜇𝐸,𝑡𝑊𝐹,𝑡 = 0  (I.32) 
Equations (I.26) and (I.27) provide the Euler consumption with a collateral constraint 
1
𝐶𝐸,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡 � 1𝐶𝐸,𝑡+1 𝑅𝐸,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� + 𝜆𝐸,𝑡𝐸𝑡 �𝑅𝐸,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1�  (I.33) 
Combining equations (I.26) and (I.28), we set the real estate demand equation with collateral 
constraint as follows 
𝑞𝑡
𝐶𝐸,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 � 𝛽𝐸𝐶𝐸,𝑡+1 �𝜈 𝑌𝐸,𝑡+1𝑋𝑡+1𝐻𝐸,𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡�� + 𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑡�𝜆𝐸,𝑡𝑞𝑡+1�  (I.34) 
Moreover, equations (I.26), (I.29) and (I.30) produce the investment equation 
1
𝐶𝐸,𝑡 �1 + 𝜓𝑘𝛿 � 𝐼𝑡𝐾𝑡−1 − 𝛿�� = 𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡 � 1𝐶𝐸,𝑡+1 �𝜓𝑘𝛿 �𝐼𝑡+1𝐾𝑡 − 𝛿� 𝐼𝑡+1𝐾𝑡 − 𝜓𝑘2𝛿 �𝐼𝑡+1𝐾𝑡 − 𝛿�2�� +𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡 � 1𝐶𝐸,𝑡+1 �𝜇𝑌𝐸,𝑡+1𝑋𝑡+1𝐾𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)��  (I.35) 
Finally, equations (I.31) and (I.32) give us the following labor demand conditions 
𝛼(1 − 𝜇 − 𝜈) 𝑌𝐸,𝑡
𝑋𝑡
= 𝑊𝑈,𝑡𝑁𝑈,𝑡 (I.36) 
and (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜇 − 𝜈) 𝑌𝐸,𝑡
𝑋𝑡
= 𝑊𝐹,𝑡𝑁𝐹,𝑡  (I.37) 
 
I.5 COMMERCIAL BANK 
A banker has a preference defined as 
𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝐵 𝑡∞𝑡=0 �𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐵,𝑡�  (I.38) 
The banker maximizes her utility (I.38) subject to the following constraints 
𝑋𝐵,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛾)�𝐿𝐹,𝑡 + 𝐿𝐸,𝑡� − 𝐷𝑡 (I.39) 
𝐶𝐵,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝐿𝐸,𝑡 + 𝐿𝐹,𝑡 + 𝜙�𝑋𝐵,𝑡� = 𝐷𝑡 + 𝑅𝐸,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐿𝐸,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1 − 𝑍𝐹,𝑡 (I.40) 
and 
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𝑍𝐹,𝑡 = 𝑓 𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−12 �𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐻𝐹,𝑡−1 − (1 − 𝜔�)�2  (I.41) 
The Lagrangian for the banker is the one below 
Γ = 𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝐵 𝑡∞𝑡=0 �𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐵,𝑡� +𝜇𝐵,𝑡 � 𝐷𝑡 + 𝑅𝐸,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐿𝐸,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝐹,𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐿𝐹,𝑡−1 − 𝑍𝐹,𝑡
−𝐶𝐵,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 𝐷𝑡−1 − 𝐿𝐸,𝑡 −  𝐿𝐹,𝑡 − 𝜙�𝑋𝐵,𝑡�� 
In that, the banker chooses 𝐶𝐵,𝑡, 𝐷𝑡 , 𝐿𝐸,𝑡, and 𝐿𝐹,𝑡. The first-order conditions are  
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝐶𝐵,𝑡 = 1𝐶𝐵,𝑡 − 𝜇𝐵,𝑡 = 0  (I.42) 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝐷𝑡
= 𝜇𝐵,𝑡 − 𝛽𝐵𝐸𝑡 �𝜇𝐵,𝑡+1 𝑅𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� + 𝜇𝐵,𝑡𝜙′�𝑋𝐵,𝑡� = 0 (I.43) 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝐿𝐸,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐵𝐸𝑡 �𝜇𝐵,𝑡+1 𝑅𝐸,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� − 𝜇𝐵,𝑡 − 𝜇𝐵,𝑡(1 − 𝛾)𝜙′�𝑋𝐵,𝑡� = 0  (I.44) 
and 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝐿𝐹,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐵𝐸𝑡 �𝜇𝐵,𝑡+1 𝑅𝐹,𝑡𝜋𝑡+1� − 𝜇𝐵,𝑡 
−𝜇𝐵,𝑡(1 − 𝛾)𝜙′�𝑋𝐵,𝑡� − 𝛽𝐵𝐸𝑡 �𝜇𝐵,𝑡+1 𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡+1𝜕𝐿𝐹,𝑡 � = 0   (I.45) 
The condition for the demand of deposits is given by equations (I.42) and (I.43) 
𝛽𝐵𝐸𝑡 �
𝑅𝑡
𝜋𝑡+1
� = 𝐸𝑡 �𝐶𝐵,𝑡+1𝐶𝐵,𝑡 � �1 + 𝜙′�𝑋𝐵,𝑡��  (I.46) 
From equations (I.42) and (I.44), we model the condition for loan supply to the entrepreneur 
𝛽𝐵𝐸𝑡 �
𝑅𝐸,𝑡
𝜋𝑡+1
� = 𝐸𝑡 �𝐶𝐵,𝑡+1𝐶𝐵,𝑡 � �1 + (1 − 𝛾)𝜙′�𝑋𝐵,𝑡��  (I.47) 
Lastly, the condition for loan supply to the financially constrained household is given by 
incorporating the effects from equations (I.42) and (I.45), as such  
𝛽𝐵𝐸𝑡 �
𝑅𝐹,𝑡
𝜋𝑡+1
� = 𝐸𝑡 �𝐶𝐵,𝑡+1𝐶𝐵,𝑡 � �1 + (1 − 𝛾)𝜙′�𝑋𝐵,𝑡�� + 𝛽𝐵𝐸𝑡 �𝜕𝑍𝐹,𝑡+1𝜕𝐿𝐹,𝑡 �  (I.48) 
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APPENDIX II: DATA DESCRIPTION 
- Delinquency Rate on Single-Family Residential Mortgages: Booked in Domestic Offices, All 
Commercial Banks, Percent, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
- S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index: Index Q1 2009=100, Quarterly, Not 
Seasonally Adjusted, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
- Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator: Index 2009=100, Quarterly, Seasonally 
Adjusted, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
